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NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
LAND REFORM IN THIRD WORLD NATIONS
WILLIAM C. THIESENHUSEN*
I.
From the end of World War II until the Kennedy administration, the almost
single-minded national security goal of the United States was prevention of
another world conflagration. The emphasis was on high technology and in-
tricate organization of the armed forces. Cuba and Viet Nam, however,
changed that view. As Premier Khrushchev repeated his endorsement of "Wars
of National Liberation," President Kennedy became frustrated with the in-
ability of the U.S. to prevent what he saw as inroads by the extreme left
wing in the Third World. Although guerrilla wars are not strangers to American
history, the last such war the United States was actively involved in was the
conquest of the Philippines after 1898. From that time to the 1960s, American
policy-makers forgot much. As the Soviet Union closed the technological gap
in nuclear weaponry, President Kennedy came to believe that the U.S. might
achieve its goals by guerrilla warfare without risking'a conventional or a nuclear
war. I
Eventually, a two-track policy was established to enable the U.S. to cope
with insurgency. One track was conventional, and it depended on military
strength. An example of the second track was the Alliance for Progress,
established in 1961 as a means for President Kennedy to win over Latin
American nations and to offer a counterpoint to the Cuban threat. In a sense,
this was international patronage. The strategy in its most cynical restatement
seemed sanguine: avert possible warfare by making U.S. aid contingent upon
reforms that gave the excluded poor-those deemed most apt to rebel-more
participation in society. It was believed that this strategy would allow for a
peaceful revolution without which a violent one would be inevitable.2
On January 18, 1962, President Kennedy established a special counterin-
surgency group,' headed by Maxwell Taylor. The ambitious mandate of this
group was "to insure proper recognition throughout the United States govern-
ment that subversive insurgency is a major form of politico-military conflict
equal in importance to conventional warfare."" In the process, a new term,
* University of Wisconsin, Madison.
1. G. BASTIAN, et al., GENERALS FOR PEACE AND DisARmAm NT: A CHALLENGE TO US/NATO
STRATEGY 51-52 (1984).
2. J. PETRAs & R. LAPORTE, JR., CULTIVATING REVOLUTION 375-406 (1971); H. WRDA
&H. KLINE, LATIN AMEpICAN POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENTS 70 ff. (2d ed. 1985). See generally
R. AYRES, BANKING ON THE POOR: THE WORLD BANK AND WORLD POVERTY (1983).
3. National Security Action Memorandum, No. 124.
4. U. JOHNSON, THE RIGHT HAND OF POWER 329-30 (1980).
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"counterinsurgency," was added to the lexicon of foreign affairs. The
appointed group preferred "internal defense," but Taylor and the President
insisted upon "counterinsurgency," and so it remained.'
In his memoirs, U. Alexis Johnson, then Deputy Undersecretary of State
and a member of the Taylor group, summarized the group's thinking: "[W]e
did not want to adopt a blanket policy of opposing all change, even violent
change, in developing countries. What we wished to combat was letting small
groups of native communists confiscate the revolutionary process and con-
vert it to their own ends." ' A book, nicknamed the "CI Bible," was the
result of the deliberations of the Taylor group. Its conclusion was that military
measures alone were not the answer and that "[tihe primary purpose of inter-
nal defense programs is to deal with and eliminate the cause of dissidence
and violence."' The cause referred to was poverty.
Thus, President Truman's Point Four program was infused with a broader
mandate. This infusion went so far as to give the foreign aid bills a consti-
tuency and helped assure right-wing support for them. Rather than stumbling
though Congress as a purely altruistic program, it could now be sold to the
American people on a more streamlined basis: foreign aid is vital because
of what it means to U.S. national security. Congressmen from areas with
large pockets of poverty, who had always had difficulty arguing for aid to
poor people far away, could now talk the more understandable idiom of
self-defense.
Ambassador Johnson summarized his own interest in the matter by stating
that: "To the degree that we could succeed in aiding development, the condi-
tions giving rise to insurgency would be removed." He also recognized the
need for distributive measures. Writing in the July 1962 Foreign Service Jour-
nal, he stated a fundamental paradox: "In some cases only radical reforms
will obtain the necessary results. Yet the measures we advocate may strike
at the very foundations . . .of the government's control."' Idealists may
cringe that the same group that provided added funds for more Green Berets
also provided the rationale for more United States support of development
and land reform in the Third World.
II.
In fact, history does not have to be searched long to find an example of
U.S.-backed reform that redounded to its best interest (if the trade difficulties
Japan now gives America can be forgotten for a moment). Post-World War
II Japan is the best contemporary example of land reform for reasons of U.S.
5. Id. at 330.
6. Id. at 331.
7. Id. at 331-32. Charles Maechling of President Lyndon Johnson's staff took the lead in
writing the "CI Bible," more properly called the UNrrED STATES OvERSEAs INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE
PoLIcY.
8. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 336.
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national security, just as it is the best example of a reform that served
a wide public good. On the eve of the postwar reform, the rural social struc-
ture in Japan was made up of three segments: (1) those who owned and
cultivated land; (2) those who cultivated but did not own land; and (3) those
who owned land but did not cultivate it. In terms of households, there were
about one-third in each group. In terms of land occupied, about one-half
of Japanese land was farmed by owners and one-half was tenanted. Of the
land leased to tenants, 18 percent was owned by absentee landlords, 24 per-
cent by noncultivating landlords, and 58 percent by owner-farmers. Before
the 1947 reforms, about 6 million families worked on areas of less than two
acres per family, much of this extremely fragmented.9
Furthermore, there was a great demand for land resulting in high rents,
which caused sharpened tensions and antagonisms between tenant and landlord.
Land ownership and operatorship were concentrated at the upper end of the
distribution curve. In an important sense, the land tenure system was a reflec-
tion of an inequitable social structure, much as it is today in most of the
Third World.
Low incomes and other grievances galvanized peasants into unions, and
a growing number of peasant-landlord disputes occurred until the World War
II years. Some very limited land distribution between 1926 and 1936 had im-
proved the situation somewhat, but landlords were able to obstruct reforms
up to the end of the war. During the war, these agrarian problems of inequity
receded into the background as Japan attempted to produce enough food,
no matter what the cost.
Agrarianists believe that the instability and crises of the 1930s, and even
the war, might be partially attributable to faulty land tenure relations. Indeed,
Dore has attributed the Japanese desire for overseas expansion to, among
other factors, a combination of: (1) population pressure on resources; (2) lack
of an adequate domestic market; (3) the army finding support for its expan-
sionist policies in the distress of the peasants; (4) the social structure of the
village and the authority of the landlord, which were congenial to the develop-
ment of totalitarianism; and (5) poverty, which breeds aggression." According
to Elias Tuma, "These are hypotheses but they seem logical enough as reasons
for the Allied Powers to justify land tenure reforms after Japan surrendered."
The social problem became clearer toward the end of the war, which brought
increasing food scarcities and rising profit margins in agriculture. These ris-
ing profit margins brought some landlords back to the countryside, thus ac-
centuating the rural class problem.
To forestall an externally imposed reform by the Supreme Commander of
Allied Powers (SCAP), the Imperial Japanese Government passed a reform
bill in the Diet three months after surrender. The SCAP rejected the pro-
9. E. Ttrm , TwENrr-Six CENTURIS oF AGRARALN Rr-o m: A Co pAATrE ANALYSIS (1965);
much information in this section comes from id. at 129.46.
10. R. DoRE, LAND REFORM IN JAPAN (1959).
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posed reform bill as being too conservative. The transparent aim of the bill
was to preserve the social structure of the village. The SCAP order had as
its central purpose the "destruction of feudal social relations in Japanese
villages." The revised land reform bill became law upon the approval of SCAP
on October 21, 1946. As a result of the reform, owner-cultivated land ex-
panded from 56 percent of the total in 1947 to 90 percent in 1950. The reform
reduced the average farm size appreciably. Dore believes that incomes were
equilibrated enough by the reform to change the village-level power struc-
tures. New owners came to dominate village-level politics as land reform was
accompanied by other government measures meant to decentralize. In
sociopolitical terms, Tuma feels that the reform undermined the influence of
the former landlord group and weakened the rigidity of the social structure
which obstructed social mobility. In political terms, "Land reform . .. in-
ured Japanese peasants to the appeals of socialism and made them the strongest
and most loyal supporters of the conservative parties.""
This does not mean that the reform process was smooth. Reactionary forces
attempted to sabotage the land reform bill by passing a weaker bill than SCAP
demanded and by challenging it through the court system. Landlords also
attempted to give and withdraw favors to peasants; grazing rights, which were
not included in the reform, are an example. Lastly, landlords were able to
influence the locally elected land commissions, which helped to administer
the reforms, by electing conservative members. Landlords also kept some of
the best lands, or made certain that prime property rights went to carefully
chosen peasants or to relatives with whom they divided the land in order to
avoid maximum size limitations. Even more landlords moved back to the coun-
tryside and began farming again to evade the expropriation that was inevitable
for absentee owners. When land sale was made legal again in 1950, there was
some resale of land to larger proprietors.
Citing the reforms of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, India, Mexico, Bolivia, and
Venezuela, and the Stolypin reforms of Russia, Huntington generalizes on
land reform by commenting that:
The peasantry . . . may be the bulwark of the status quo or the
shock troops of revolution. Which role the peasant plays is deter-
mined by the extent to which the existing system meets his im-
mediate economic and material needs as he sees them. These needs
normally focus on land tenure and tenancy, taxes, and prices.
Where the conditions of land-ownership are equitable and provide
a viable living for the peasant, revolution is unlikely. Where they
are inequitable and where the peasant lives in poverty and suffer-
ing, revolution is likely, if not inevitable, unless the government
takes prompt measures to remedy these conditions. No social group
is more conservative than a landowning peasantry, and none is more
revolutionary than a peasantry which owns too little land or pays
11. S. HUNTINGTON, POLricAL ORDER IN CHANGING SoCITIES 376 (1968).
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too high a rental. The stability of government in modernizing coun-
tries is thus, in some measure, dependent upon its ability to pro-
mote reform in the countryside .... Land reform carried out by
revolution or by other means thus turns the peasantry from a poten-
tial source of revolution into a fundamentally conservative social
force .... Like any reform, however, some violence may be needed
to produce the reform, and the reform itself may produce some
violence. 2
III.
The U.S. was a reactionary influence when Mexico was instituting its land
reform, and the U.S. regarded Bolivia's efforts in the same direction in the
mid-1950s with circumspection. In 1956, however, Washington's mission in
Saigon argued for reform in Viet Nam; the United States also pushed for
land reform with the Shah of Iran. In the 1960s, as a reaction to Cuba, the
Kennedy administration came to believe that land reform might work in Latin
America. The rationale was simple: by conditioning aid upon reforms, the
U.S. could forestall the spread of communism in the Northern Hemisphere
and make its "own backyard" more secure. An opposing side to this argu-
ment also developed. Since the Soviet Union, Cuba, and China had made
agrarian reform a central part of their postrevolutionary programs, were we
not forgetting the sacredness of private property, long a cornerstone of the
American legal system? These ideas were often generated by oligarchies and
private business. It was on these same grounds that the United States had
undermined the regime that had fought for agrarian reform in Guatemala
in the mid-1950s.
With the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, the U.S. had much more
of an uphill battle with reforms than in Japan. First, the milieu was different.
'Laws in many Latin American countries prohibited effective unionization.
Furthermore, at the time of reform, Japan had a high level of industrializa-
tion, with labor-intensive packages of technology in rural and urban areas.
Japan was also using the land in the countryside intensively and had a high
level of literacy.
In contrast, Latin America had few industries at the time; therefore, rural-
urban migration was not the same kind of political safety valve for surplus
labor; if campesinos migrated to town, they were often unemployed. The
technology used by Latin American countries was largely borrowed from coun-
tries that had developed it under conditions that called for more capital in-
tensity in an ambience of scarce labor. Furthermore, literacy in Latin America
was low.
Also, Japan had a viable system of small-scale operatorship. In this con-
text, it is not difficult to change a small-scale tenant into a small-scale owner-
12. Id. at 375-78.
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operator. On the other hand, with Latin America's bimodal agrarian struc-
ture, not only the ownership but also the scale of operation often had to
be fundamentally altered, and the institutions serving agriculture had to be
redirected. Further, the traditional structure of Latin American agriculture
was based on large-scale haciendas owned by the elites, on one hand, and
tiny minifundios owned by the majority of those in the agricultural sector-
and landless labor or service tenants-on the other. It proved to be a wrenching
change in Latin America to convert from large-scale to small-scale owner-
operatorship, and the ill-understood production cooperative was arrived at
as a compromise. While class oppression was present in both Japan and Latin
America, the institutions responsible for such oppression were distinct.
Second, ideological battles over Latin American land reforms were intense
and protracted, and the U.S. could not impose reforms in Latin America even
if it had wanted to because it was not an occupying force. Some United States'
economic advisers felt that the change in production structure would imperil
the capacity of countries to produce a marketable surplus and, hence, would
arrest industrial growth. The influence of these economic advisers was deeply
felt within the Agency for International Development and United States' em-
bassies, which, in turn, developed ambivalent attitudes on reforms. During
the Lyndon Johnson years, U.S. support for reforming agrarian structures
lessened. This was because there were other strong reactionary forces within
the United States, often represented by the multinational corporations operating
in Latin America, which wanted short-run stability for business. Also, the
landlord class in Latin America was far from neutralized. The landlord class
could act in concert with the multinationals and other conservatively inclined
groups to slow the enactment of reform laws and their administration, or
simply to embroil the process in rhetoric. In many cases, however, the political
will for reform was absent. Yet, in some cases where it was present, like in
Chile, the U.S. read marxism into the equation and stifled reform as it had
in Guatemala in 1954.
In recent years in Latin America, there has been a rollback of reforms in
some countries, like Chile and Peru. 3 Other countries, such as Argentina and
Brazil, never had reforms. In still others, like Colombia, reform sectors were
nothing but Potemkin villages. The result of this is that social problems of
inequality in Latin America and other parts of the Third World may be more
acute today than several decades ago.
IV.
Recent years have also seen profound changes occurring in most of the
Third World. At the United States' collective peril, it tends to regard these
poor countries as homogeneous masses of humanity with curious customs and
culture, poor and outside of the mainstream-a group of nations that can
13. Thiesenhusen, The Illusory Goal of Equity in Latin American Agrarian Reform, in
INTERNATIONAL DDMNSIO S oF LAND REFOR) (Montgomery, ed. 1984), at 31-62.
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be forgotten when considering national security. Indeed, revolutions and coups
there seem endemic. The exceptions to America's general lack of interest are
those few countries that seem to be developing nuclear capabilities, those coun-
tries that have recently created havoc with our international financial markets,
those countries with imports that interfere with American producers on cer-
tain down-scale items, and those countries whose labor migrates to the United
States. The press only rarely covers Third World events in more than episodic
terms except when something dramatic happens, and even then its interest
wanes quickly.
In fact, changes in the Third World are occurring rapidly. The United States
cannot alter these changes very much because its day as a prime source of
strength, development capital, and even ideas has passed. Hegemony is dif-
ficult to achieve, even in America's own backyard.'" The days when the United
States or the Soviet Union could command by their very presence are largely
over. What the United States State Department opts for is to influence, not
to determine, what is happening in Third World nations.
Major changes that are occurring in the Third World include:
1. The less developed countries separated into two subgroups: the middle-
developed countries or MICs (having average per capita incomes of $440 to
$6,850), and the least-developed countries or LICs (with per capita incomes
below that of the MICs).' 5 The MICs are noteworthy for their growing in-
dustrial capacity, the inequality of their income distribution patterns, the
recency of their entrance into the financial markets, their debts, their new-
found interest in international trade in industrial products, and their growing
feelings of nationalism.
The upper end of this MIC category is comprised of countries that grew
economically at a very rapid rate during the 1960s and 1970s. These countries
now have a self-confidence about themselves in world affairs. Examples in-
clude Brazil, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Mexico. These countries,
however, have great remaining social problems and perhaps no need to solve
them in agriculture-or, at least, not in agriculture alone-because of their
substantial nonagricultural sectors. Their economies are increasingly complex,
and the countries have at their disposal more policy options for dealing with
poverty and dissonance.
Soon it will be difficult, if not impossible, to view all MICs as one group
because the upper middle-income countries are coming to demonstrate these
characteristics to a greater extent than the lower end of this group. At the
lower end of the MICs are El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the Philippines, coun-
tries in great ferment in which the possibility of solving pressing social prob-
lems through reform of the rural social structure still exists.
14. There is disagreement on this point. It is not as obvious to Henry Kissinger as to Richard
Feinberg, for example. See H. KISSINGER, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BATIsAN COMMISION ON
CENTRAL AmERICA, Submitted to the President of the United States (Jan. 10, 1984); Feinberg,
The Kissinger Commission Report: A Critique, 12 WoRD DEvELOPmENT 8 (Aug. 1984).
15. WORLD BANK, WORLD DE VLOPMENT REPORT, 1985, at 174-75.
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2. Many Third World countries (LICs and MICs alike) contain substan-
tial populations of the very poor-perhaps one-half the total population of
the country. Gradually, the bulk of poor people, especially in MICs, is shifting
to the urban sectors, even though it is the agricultural sectors that have the
highest proportion of persons in poverty. 6 To the extent that this group of
poor is monetized, it is hurt greatly when depressions occur but is not helped
proportionally in recovery. This group consists of a large hard-core popula-
tion of poor who are squeezed out of the system when the population grows
rapidly, when new technology decreases the number of industrial jobs, and
when excess population is unable to find decent employment opportunities
in agriculture.' In most of these countries, institutional patterns have not
enjoyed the transformation needed to meet changing economic conditions
without developing more social problems as a by-product. Rather, there has
been a herculean effort on the part of past elites to remain in power; the
technological imperative does not seem to challenge these traditional institu-
tions. The net result appears to be a dominant economy and one or several
nondominant economies operating with different rules and with some rela-
tion of one with another (usually through the labor market) within a single
country.
3. Within nearly all Third World countries, especially in the MICs, while
traditional power structures tend to remain, increased social development for
the poor has been implemented. Thus, even for the very poor, educational
facilities are improving, as are health conditions. These developments are still
rudimentary, but if the statistics of today are compared with those of fifteen
years ago, changes are great. Furthermore, mass media are quickly becoming
available to Third World countries, especially Asia and Latin America. This
means the poor are becoming familiar with how upper classes live. The in-
creased social benefits resulting from economic growth, coupled with severely
rationed economic progress, have produced restlessness, which many coun-
tries feel they must quell with progressively more repressive measures. In the
richer MICs, the state apparatus is frequently able to contain these pressures
with force; this, one supposes, is a temporary expedient. In the poorer MICs,
the result is often low-level civil disturbance, terrorism, rebellion, land inva-
sion, and sometimes revolution.
In Asia and Latin America, one way of adjusting institutions to this situa-
tion is through land reform.'" Land reform can be, all at once, a method
to cope with economic, social, and political problems. Economically, land
16. M. RrAD EL GHONEmy, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE RURAL POOR (Food & Agric.
Org. of UN, 1984); Lopez Cordovez, Trends and Recent Changes in the Latin American Food
and Agricultural Situation, CEPAL REv. (Apr. 1982).
17. TECHNICAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN AGRICULTURE: LATIN AMERICAN PERSPEC-
TiVES (M. Pineiro & E. Trigo, eds., 1983); Thiesenhusen, Economic Effects of Technology in
Agriculture in Less Developed Countries, in TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN RURAL AREAS
(G. Summers, ed. 1983), at 235-52.
18. P. DORNER, LAND REFORM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1972); R. KING, LAND REFORM:
A WORLD SURVEY (1977).
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reform helps production to increase and lay the groundwork for a mass market
and more on-farm savings and investment. Socially, land reform can reduce
income gaps between classes and lay the framework for a more democratic
society that can bring social services to more people. Politically, land reform
can stabilize the population in a rapidly growing and politically volatile group
and reduce demands made upon governments, in effect, buying support for
the government that gave out land. Land reform, however, is no panacea.
Pressures for land reform occur in countries in which the population is
competing for inadequate resources. The reason for this is not that there
physically is no more land in the country, but that much of the good land
tends to be tied to large estates owned by traditional elites who are not using
it most advantageously for the general public.
The major economic advantages of land reform, from the standpoint of
Third World countries, which are later translated into social and political
benefits are: (1) production per hectare tends to rise; (2) ownership implies
more care to resources on the part of peasants than does tenancy; (3) year-
round in situ employment is offered so that tranference costs are low; (4)
income distribution improves; (5) peasants come to demand more products
of industry as incomes rise in the reformed sector; (6) on-farm savings and
investment increase; and (7) communities develop as their members are more
willing and able to support local institutions.
Internationally, land reform in the Third World is one of those policies
which serves the best security interest of the United States and of the Third
World country in which the land reform takes place. The major advantages
for the United States in helping this process are numerous. The United States
benefits from trade with an invigorated Third World. Moreover, trade usually
has a stablizing effect which staves off extremism. In the presence of a land
reform, the U.S. reaps the benefits of favor which attach to the government
that instituted the reform. By not helping the Nicaraguan reform, the United
States alienated the Nicaraguan peasantry and much of the region. This did
not have to occur. If the United States desires friendship and cooperation of
a nation, good politics suggests it be on the side of the reformers.
There are, however, cases in which land reform may be an immoral expe-
dient. these cases include situations where:
(a) land reform buys the support of the peasantry for a corrupt regime;
(b) the form of agrarian reform is clearly not in keeping with standards
of evironmental conservation;
(c) reform gives land to some poor as it deprives other poor people of
land, or worse, reform benefits the rich at the expense of the poor;
(d) reform freezes the peasantry on worn-out land for which insufficient
yield-increasing inputs are made available; 19
19. This is a matter for considerable discussion. In a recent article, Grace Goodell concludes:
If there is to be life after land reform . . . we cannot look to the state and its
funders to provide it. Everything about the planners' and funders' intensified and
well-coordinated "packaged" agricultural program is laudable on paper. It is
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
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(e) short term gains for the peasant (which roughly correspond to the period
during which the government needs support until it can develop repressive
capacity) are offset by massive probable long-term losses;
(f) the peasantry has little or no voice in determining the shape of reform
or its administration;
(g) the land-taking and administrative procedures are brutal and even in-
human; and
(h) reform involves public deceit so that only a few obtain land and the
remainder receive highly publicized promises."0
If a book were to be written on this subject it should be entitled "The
Morality of Land Reform." In one sense, land reform can be thought of
as patronage from the government-the price of political support. This ap-
pears often to apply within countries and internationally. When a govern-
ment acts to secure peasants on the land who might ordinarily be swept up
by insurgents, it ensures peasant support. When a foreign government helps
with land reform, it is part of counterinsurgency, of "winning their hearts
and minds." Most of the time this will result in a large number of beneficiaries:
the government, the peasant, the economy, and the foreign power that pro-
tects the government. The losers are the insurgents and the landlords.
economical, progressive, comprehensive, humane; it does not overlook a single detail;
it demands that the government replenish its own coffers, making every program
pay; it finally recognizes society's responsibility to the rural sector. And it worked
in Taiwan. Surely, the argument runs, "integration" is more efficient than chaos,
packaging more rational than piecemeal development, higher yields more desirable
than stagnation, supervision better than neglect. Surely, peasants need to be pro-
tected, chemicals to be distributed, and rural banks to be supported.
In a basic text for "getting agriculture moving" in the Third World, a leading
agricultural economist portrays the peasant victim in typical terms: "A small holder's
normal state is to be absolutely at the mercy of middlemen . . . against whom
he has no economic strength." Quite the contrary, in fact. Empirical studies in
the Latin American, African, and Asian countryside and provincial market towns
confirm such factors as the great proliferation of middlemen even among the villagers
themselves, their extremely high risks, and the keen competition among them for
the small farmers' business. But international funders and local ruling elites stand
to gain from fostering a strong anticapitalist bias against these local and provincial
entrepreneurs and thus paint a grim picture of their alleged extortions.
Goodell, After Land Reform, 23 POLicY REv. 38 & 2 (Spring 1983).
Few would argue against utilizing the private sector to the greatest extent possible, if there
is one to use and if it does compete as much as Goodell suggests for the business of land reform
beneficiaries. The facts in most countries are that the private sectors are not so pristine nor
are the public sectors so universally evil as Goodell implies.
20. J. DutKEREiu.Y, THE LONG WAR 158-60 (1982); R. BONNER, WEAKNESS AND DEcErr 187-204
(1984). See also "The Discontented: A Squatters' Village Illustrates Divisiveness of Mexican Land
Issue," Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1985.
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